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The use of performance-enhancing drugs to study or work better is often called “cognitive
enhancement” or “neuroenhancement” and sparked a debate between scholars from
many disciplines. I argue that such behavior can better be subsumed under the more
general category of “instrumental drug use”. This broader perspective allows
understanding neuroenhancement better from the perspective of addiction medicine
and public health and supports a more consistent drug policy. I also summarize the most
important systematic reviews and individual surveys of nonmedical substance use to
study or work better. Different definitions and methodologies limit the comparability of
these studies. The unified approach of drug instrumentalization would partially solve such
problems. Finally, prevalence studies from the 1960s to 1980s as well as anecdotal
evidence since the late 19th century show that instrumental drug use is and has been for a
long time a common phenomenon. It should thus also be investigated and
treated accordingly.
Keywords: enhancement, addiction medicine, drug policy, stimulant drugs, drug instrumentalizationINTRODUCTION
Neuroenhancement received a lot of attention by ethicists, legal scholars, pharmacologists, and
researchers from further disciplines since the beginning of the 21st century (1, 2).1 According to the
analysis of O’Connor, Rees, and Joffe, enhancement of the brain was also the most frequent
neuroscience-related topic in general news media (3). It actually received so much attention that
Lucke and colleagues spoke of a “neuroenhancement bubble” (4). The substances discussed most
intensively are the stimulant drugs amphetamine, methylphenidate, and its analogs, also known as
treatments for attention and impulsivity disorders, as well as the wakefulness promoter modafinil
(5–7). Presently, questions like whether the use of performance enhancing drugs at universities
should be seen as cheating (8) or psychiatrists’ attitudes towards prescribing such substances in
academic settings (9) are being discussed and investigated. The ethical and regulatory challenges of
pharmacological enhancement were also addressed in this journal very recently (10).
The topic gained popularity with the rise of “neuroethics”, a new discipline specifically intended
to cover ethical, legal, and social challenges related to the neurosciences (11). Along with1These publications in the high impact journals Nature Reviews Neuroscience and Nature received 772 and 973 Google Scholar
citations (as of August 18, 2020), respectively, and are still being cited nowadays.
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neuroenhancement is a common and increasing phenomenon,
in some cases literally “as common as coffee” (12). But a
colleague and I showed earlier that such claims are often
exaggerated (13–16). Describing neuroenhancement as new
and increasing lent and still lends much of the urgency to this
discussion and related research. We reported evidence, though,
that the phenomenon, particularly the use of stimulant drugs in
academic settings, exists at least since the 1930s (14, 15).
That people use drugs to change their psychological state in
order to study or work better has been associated with many
terms before: cognitive, affective, or neuroenhancement, brain
doping, smart drugs, non-medical drug use, recreational drug
use, substance abuse, and probably many more. Publications
in neuroethics particularly used the term “enhancement”
and discussed it with respect to ethical issues such as freedom
of choice, individual and social performance improvement,
coercion, and fairness (1, 2). In this paper, I want to put it in a
different perspective: that of instrumental drug use. Hitherto, the
discussion of neuroenhancement in neuroethics on the one hand
and research on addiction, substance abuse, drug diversion (17)
and diffusion (18) on the other have been proceeding mostly
separate from each other. For example, the previously mentioned
seminal and influential publications don’t even address the topic
of addiction (1, 2). If we frame the phenomenon as instrumental
drug use instead, we can easily integrate that which should never
have been separate in the first place.INSTRUMENTAL DRUG USE
It is a matter of fact: Many people are and have been using
substances to achieve different kinds of aims. This is what
characterizes such use as instrumental: People are doing it for
a certain purpose; the substance thus becomes an instrument to
get what people want to get. Note that this also introduces a
notion of rationality, if people are justifiably convinced that
doing something increases the likelihood of reaching a specific
goal, and are then doing it. Substance use can imply irrational
aspects, too; for example, when consumers are taking a substance
to achieve a certain goal but at the same time damage themselves
or others. This would conflict with the aim of being healthy and
maintaining good relations.2 People could also fail to stop using
substances, even knowing that they harm themselves or others or
that their use is getting out of control. This puts us into the domain
of addiction, which has traditionally been discussed as an example
for limiting human rationality and freedom. What I want to show
here is that—at least within certain boundaries—substance use can
be instrumental and thus rational. And substances affecting
the nervous system on which our psychological functioning2It goes without saying that some consumers might simply not care about their own
health or the wellbeing of others when trying to achieve their aims. Many athletes
engaging in doping accept the possible—and in some cases even probable—health
risks, perhaps even the risk of death, associated with performance-enhancing drug
consumption. The philosophical discussion of which behaviors can be deemed
rational and which not goes beyond the purview of this paper.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 2relies are in many instances called “drugs”. In that sense, drugs
can be understood as instruments, which has particularly been
elaborated theoretically as well as practically by Christian P. Müller
(19, 20).
Müller argues that instrumental drug use has ancient roots in
human and actually also non-human history and that it can
have an adaptive value in evolution. Thus, animals being able
to use drugs to increase their chances of survival and
procreation would have evolutionary benefits. Specifically and
for humans in the present society, he distinguished nine different
goals of drug instrumentalization: (1) improving social
interaction; (2) facilitating sexual behavior; (3) improving
cognitive performance or counteracting fatigue; (4) facilitating
recovery or coping with stress; (5) self-medication for psychiatric
disorders and mental problems; (6) sensory curiosity (e.g.
“expanding” one’s perceptions); (7) experiencing euphoria,
hedonia, or a “high”; (8) improving physical appearance
or attractiveness; and (9) facilitating spiritual or religious
activities (19).
Note that just by distinguishing these nine goals one does
not automatically approve of that behavior. In the debate,
“enhancement” or “brain doping” might be positively or
negatively biased concepts, respectively. In contrast to that,
“instrumental drug use” seems a more neutral alternative, an
alternative that provides us with a general analytical tool to
make sense of people’s drug consumption. In the context of the
neuroenhancement debate, particularly Müller’s first (social
interaction), third (cognitive performance), and fourth (coping
with stress) goal would be salient, as these are arguably relevant
domains in present-day study and work environments. To
demonstrate the usefulness of this analytical category, I shall
discuss studies about the prevalence of instrumental drug use,
from the past as well as the present, and then try to unify the
different perspectives in the conclusion.PREVALENCE STUDIES
Dozens of studies addressed the prevalence of instrumental drug
use in study or work contexts. Already in 2011, Smith and Farah
reviewed evidence from 28 individual articles investigating
students’ “nonmedical stimulant use” published between 2000
and 2009 (21). It is important to understand that methodologies
varied widely: Most studies were based on self-reports from
non-representative samples sized between N = 50 and N = 54,079
participants. The kinds of drugs included in the surveys differed
(e.g. only prescription stimulants like methylphenidate or
amphetamine or also illicit drugs like cocaine) as did the time
spans (last month, last year, or lifetime use). Unsurprisingly, the
outcomes then varied widely between 1.7 and 55%. The latter
figure comes from a study investigating only fraternity members
at a single location, a group that is notorious for its above-
average drug use (22). Finally, not all studies asked for themotives
of the nonmedical drug use and where they were surveyed
answers also indicated recreational use like experiencing a
“high” or partying better.September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 567497
3In personal correspondence, Sean McCabe referred to another study in which
they addressed the frequency of consumption. There, indeed, 82.1% of past-year
nonmedical users of prescription stimulants reported use on less than 10
occasions (26).
Schleim Neuroenhancement as Instrumental Drug UseA very recent systematic review of nonmedical prescription
stimulant use found already 111 studies meeting the inclusion
criteria (23). But just like Smith and Farah before, Faraone and
colleagues found much variance between the publications in terms
of definitions used to investigate nonmedical use, methodologies,
and samples, which made a formalized meta-analysis impossible.
Similar to the earlier review, the prevalence of self-reported use
varied between 2.1 and 58.7% and almost exclusively referred to
student populations. The only population-based estimate, the US
National Survey on Drug Use and Health 2015–2016, found that
2.1% adults had used stimulant drugs nonmedically at least once
in the past year (24). Importantly, Faraone and colleagues discuss
the reasons for which people had used the drugs in much detail.
Academic motivations were mentionedmost frequently. However,
this may simply reflect that most participants were college
students for whom this is particularly salient. The second most
commonly mentioned reason was recreation (e.g. “getting high”,
enhancing the effects of other drugs, help with socializing). Weight
loss was cited less frequently as motivation. Summarizing all the
data, males, 18–25 year-olds, whites, fraternity/sorority members,
students with worse grades, people who had been binge drinking
in the last month, had used marijuana or nonprescription
stimulants (e.g. MDMA or methamphetamine) in the past year,
had had adverse childhood experiences, and have not grown up
with both biological parents were most likely to use prescription
stimulants (23). The authors conclude that this use is a significant
public health problem, but that it has not reached epidemic
proportions like nonmedical opioid use in the United States.
One survey deserving individual attention is the recent cross-
sectional study of pharmacological cognitive enhancement among
non-ADHD individuals in 15 countries by Maier and colleagues
(25). Their data are based on the Global Drug Survey of 2015 and
2017, jointly comprising responses of more than N = 100,000
subjects who filled out questionnaires anonymously on the internet
in response to advertisements in offline and online media.
Remarkably, the authors report an almost threefold increase of
the 12-month prevalence of prescription stimulant, modafinil, and/
or illegal stimulant use to increase performance when studying or
working from, on average, 4.9 to 13.7% in the 15 countries (United
States, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Ireland,
France, Australia, Hungary, Brazil, Austria, Switzerland, Germany,
Portugal, and New Zealand; in the order of the prevalence in 2017,
from highest to lowest). In some countries, the increase would have
been sixfold (France, from 2.7 to 16.2%) or almost sixfold (Ireland,
from 3.4 to 18.8%) in only two years.
However, the authors concede that the wording of the
questions was changed between the two cohorts and that, while
their annual surveys on drug use always run from November to
January, the new module on performance enhancing use for the
2017 cohort had to be removed after only one month because it
had made the survey too long (25). Therefore, the second cohort
is almost two thirds smaller than the first. The authors conclude
that the differences still reflect a real increase of stimulant use for
performance enhancement. Yet, as I see it, there is the possibility
that drug consumers were more motivated to respond quickly and
to complete the long version of the survey than non-consumers.Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 3This shows that it is difficult to make reliable statements about
an increase even by studies from the same research team if
the procedure is not repeated exactly and not based on a
representative sample. An interesting finding of the second
cohort, though, is that cannabis, alcohol, and benzodiazepines,
which have been added in the 2017 survey, were also mentioned
as performance enhancement drugs by many, particularly to
increase relaxation such that one could study or work better at
a later time.
To my knowledge, the hitherto most reliable evidence for an
increase is reported by McCabe and colleagues, who repeated a
survey at a North American college six times in the period from
2003 to 2013 (17). The non-representative samples reported an
increase from 5.4 to 9.3% for the past-year and from 8.1 to 12.7%
for the lifetime nonmedical use of stimulant drugs, respectively.
Unfortunately, the researchers did not publish their results on the
frequency of consumption. Students might thus simply have tried
to find out what the media hype described in the Introduction
above is about and used the substances only a few times.3
I would now like to compare these systematic reviews and
essential surveys from the 21st century with studies published
before 1990. To my knowledge, they have neither been addressed
in the neuroethical debate nor in the studies summarized above.
Smith and Blachly, for example, reported in 1966 that 92 (44%)
of 208 medical students had used amphetamine at least once in
their life (27). Of these consumers, 46% mentioned reduced
fatigue, 11% reduced appetite, 10% improved alertness, 4%
improved attention span, and also 4% increased motivation as
benefits. Note that this is also instrumental drug use in the sense
Müller described above (19, 20). In a much bigger sample of
N = 7,170 New England college students, Wechsler and Rohman
investigated, among other drugs, marijuana, stimulant, cocaine,
tranquilizer, and hallucinogen consumption (28). The past-year
prevalence reported in 1981 was 59.3, 16.2, 11.1, 9.6, and 7.8%,
respectively. Of these consumers, 16% had used stimulants, 11%
cocaine, and 10% tranquilizers to stay awake or study better,
which we would nowadays often call “neuroenhancement”.
The most relevant study I found from this period is by
McAuliffe and colleagues who reviewed prevalence data on
nonmedical drug use by present and future health professionals
in no less than 21 individual studies published between 1966 and
1980 (29). Besides recreational use and self-treatment, they also
defined instrumental use “to stay awake, to fall asleep, or to
perform better on tests or in sports” as nonmedical use. The
lifetime prevalence of amphetamine consumption, which was
mostly instrumental, ranged between 11 and 54% in these
samples. The authors discuss that the instrumental amphetamine
use would be declining since the mid-1960s, while the recreational
use of other drugs would be increasing. The same authors
published a survey of N = 337 physicians, N = 312 pharmacists,
N = 381 medical, and N = 278 pharmacy students two years afterSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 567497
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sedatives, and opioids, the groups had a self-reported 33.3, 19.3,
43.6, and 41.1% past-year prevalence, respectively, for recreational,
instrumental use, and self-treatment combined. The professionals
reported an average of 43.7 consumptions in their life and the
students between 64.6 and 65.7. The lifetime prevalence for
instrumental use in particular, thus to stay awake, facilitate
work, or sports, was 16% for the physicians and 17% for the
medical students.
These figures suggest that nonmedical drug use in general and
instrumental consumption to study or work better was common,
perhaps even more common in the 1960s to 1980s than it
is now in the early 21st century. Anecdotal evidence for
students consuming amphetamine to improve their academic
performance can be traced back until the 1930s in the USA and
the Netherlands (31–33). Instrumental stimulant drug use is
likely even half a century older in Europe, where the German
pharmacologist and military surgeon Theodor Aschenbrandt
gave cocaine to Bavarian soldiers during a maneuver in 1883
and noted their increased capacity to endure hunger, strain,
fatigue, and heavy burdens (34), which in turn inspired Sigmund
Freud’s research on the drug (35).45Everything else being equal. Of course, it could be that common consumptionCONCLUSION
A critical conclusion from the previous section is that the rationale
of carrying out ever more surveys on consumption prevalence
is questionable if they use such different definitions and
methodologies that even after 60 years of research no clear
picture emerges, not even on whether the substance use
is increasing relevantly or not. A common view on drug
instrumentalization could solve at least some of these issues. In
any case, the evidence reviewed in this paper suggests that
neuroenhancement, if one wants to use this term, was certainly
not a new phenomenon in the early 2000s. That stimulant drugs
and mostly amphetamine and methylphenidate, which are
available since the 1930s to 1950s, still belong to the most
frequently nonmedically used substances according to the
studies summarized above supports that conclusion. Note that
evidence that these drugs are actually enhancing the functioning of
healthy people in real-life settings is scarce as the new meta-
analysis by Roberts and colleagues demonstrates once more (7).
Caviola and Faber argued earlier that the effects are probably not
better than those of computer training, physical exercise, and
healthy sleep (36). Additionally, the minor to modest effects of the
drugs have to be balanced against their risks and side-effects.
Perhaps it was due to the enthusiasm of neuroethicists who
emerged as a new profession in the early 2000s that such drug use
was described as a new trend and framed first as “enhancement”
and then as “neuroenhancement”. But does it make sense to
discuss the old phenomenon under a new label? I proposed here
to apply Müller’s general framework of instrumental drug use
instead (19, 20). That a substantial amount of people use various4I am indebted to my colleague Jeremy Burman for drawing my attention to
Freud's early research on cocaine.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 4kinds of substances to achieve certain goals is a fact. From a
public health perspective, it appears to make no sense to treat the
nine different aims distinguished by Müller differently, as the
risks of the consumption of, say, amphetamine do not differ
whether someone uses the drug to study longer or to party
longer.5 We have seen that, by contrast, framing substance use to
study or work better as “enhancement” carried the risk of not
addressing the problem of addiction at all (1, 2). Interestingly, the
new survey by Maier and colleagues also found that about 28% of
the stimulant consumers taking the substances to increase their
cognitive performance would like to use less, but fewer than 2%
reported to actually seek help (25). This suggests that this could
be an important field for addiction medicine.
Treating Müller’s nine goals differently on the legal or ethical
level would require someone to take value judgments about
which are morally better or worse aims. My considerations
don’t amount to a radical legalization of all substances, but
rather to a more consistent treatment of them, in accordance
with persistent calls for a more science-based drug policy (37).
Concurring with a critique voiced against Müller’s approach
before by Wu, I would emphasize the importance to protect
people from too much external pressure and coercion such that
they are as autonomous as possible to choose for themselves
(38, 39). The big difference between, for example, English- and
German-speaking countries that came up in the survey by
Maier and colleagues calls for follow-up studies investigating
cultural, social, and economic factors explaining why so
many more people take stimulant drugs in the former than
in the latter. But also for this research the idea of drug
instrumentalization would provide a viable and actually more
fine-grained framework.DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
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